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This note gives a syntactic presentation for partial algebraic theories (see [1] and [3]). The logic, 
called left exact logic, is interpretable in any category with all finite limits, and it has coherent 
logic as a conservative extension, which implies a completeness theorem. 
e Left exact logic, L,,,,o, is a fragment of coherent logic, g e Lo.~. Loco uses the 
vocabulary of Horn logic with operators: terms are built up from sorted operator 
symbols and variables, atomic sentences are equations between same-sorted terms, 
sentences are conjunctions of atomic sentences. Note conjunctions in g Zoo,,, are 
e finite, so L~,o is finitary. Sequents of e L,o,o are one-sided, admitting at most a single 
sentence as consequent. 
Le,o includes the usual axioms of equality, the trivial axioms 27 =~0 whenever 
¢e27, and the rules for conjunction: 
A theory in e L~ has a set TA of non-logical axioms and uses the restricted cut 
rule 
27, O, ~ = Z when 0 = ~ is an axiom of equality or 
27, 0=X an instance of a non-logical axiom 
T has a set Tc of type introduction clauses, written 
(A) (E(ol,. . . ,  On) JR 1 (C) = D 1 A""  Apn(c  ) = On) 
where E(ol, ..., on) is a sentence in the indicated variables, and c is a variable not 
among the ol, ..., on, and Pl, " . ,Pn are operator symbols of the language going 
from the sort of c to the sorts of 01,..., on respectively. 
Type introduction clauses have no effect on which sentences are well formed. 
They are not sentences, nor sequents. They determine the theory as admitting cer- 
tain rules of inference. 
If T includes the clause (A), then 
0022-4049/86/$3.50 © 1986, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland) 
64 C. McLarty 
(B) 
=E(p,(c),...,p.(c)). 
p,  (c) =p,  (c ' )A .-- Ap . (c )  =p.  (c ' )  = c = c '  
are axioms of T and 
_r, E( f i ,  . . . ,  t,), p~(c) = tl A-.. Ap,,(c) = t,  = x 
Z, E(t l ,  . . . ,  t.) = X 
c not in conclusion 
is a rule of inference in T. 
Intuitively, to include (A) in a theory means the sort of c is the limit, via the 
operators Pi, of the diagram indicated by the equations of E - the extension of E 
in the usual way. This intuition isjustified two ways. First, we stipulate that a model 
of an L~,,o theory with clause (A) must have the given limit as interpretation of the 
sort of c. 
c Second, it is not hard to see an Lo~,o theory T has an extension T g in g Loooj given 
by these two steps: 
(a) Extend the language by adding (fir_) and V with the usual formation rules and 
rules of inference. Keep the original axioms (including the axioms in (B) if there are 
type introduction clauses). 
(b) For each type introduction clause (A) in T add an axiom: 
(c )  E(o,,..., v.)= (firc)(p, (c) = v, A-- .  Ap . (c )  = o.) .  
By the 'first main fact' in [4] any model for the coherent heory T g will make the 
sort of c the limit of the diagram indicated by E. So any model of T in a category 
which has stable sups and images extends uniquely to a model of T g. We will apply 
this for models in SET. 
In fact, Tg is a conservative extension of T. Suppose 
(D) Z = @ 
is a sequent of L,o~,e provable in T g using the rules of Loo,o.g Then Lg,o has a 
generalized Hauptsatz saying (D) has a proof using only subsentences of sentences 
in Z', ~0, or the non-logical axioms of T g. By construction one of these involves V. 
The only ones involving (fir-) are axioms of the form (C) and it is easy to see the 
only results in the language of L~o,o which follow from such axioms already follow 
in the logic of Le,o from the type introduction clause (A). 
The argument applied to Horn logic in [4, p. 96] applies to L~,  o, proving 
S 
T~p if and only if T~p 
where T ~ ~0 means ~0 is true in every model of T in a category with finite limits, and 
T~0 means ~0 is true in every Set-model of T. 
So we have these equivalences: 






T g t--- ¢p in g Looco 
T I---¢p in e La,to 
The second step is justified by the unique extension of models in SET, the third by 
the completeness theorem for finitary theories in Lg~, (see [4, p. 162]), the fourth 
by the conservative extension result above. 
The motivating examples of left exact theories are category theory and its partial 
algebraic extensions - the theory of categories with finite limits, the theory of 
toposes, and so on. The left exact theory of categories has two basic types: Ob and 
Ar, for objects and arrows respectively, and the usual function symbols: 
d0"Ar - ,Ob ,  d 1 • Ar--,Ob and id" Ob-*Ar. Then there is a type introduction 
clause: 
(dl ( f )  = do(g) ] Pl (c) =fAP2(C) = g) 
with f and g of type Ar, and c of the introduced type C. C is the type of composable 
pairs of arrows. Finally there is a function symbol for composition o • C~Ar .  The 
theory has the obvious axioms. One could define the type of parallel pairs of arrows, 
and a function symbol to be axiomatized as assigning to each such pair an equalizer. 
Thus one can give a left exact theory of categories with all finite limits, and so on. 
It may be helpful to contrast left exact logic with a similar doctrine, the universal 
Horn logic of Keane [2]. In a universal horn theory all types are products of the 
basic types and all functions are totally defined, but the axioms can require func- 
tions to satisfy given equations on equationally defined subvarieties of types. For 
example, there is a universal Horn theory of categories and in it composition is 
defined for all pairs of arrows but the axioms only apply to 'composable pairs' in 
the usual sense. The associative law is expressed as a conditional equation: 
[d l ( f )=do(g)Adl (g)=do(h)]=fo(go h) =( fo  g)o h. 
Universal Horn logic is the natural setting for theories such as monoids with 
cancellation, or rings in which all idempotents commute. It expresses, for example, 
the right cancellation condition on a monoid by: xy = zy=x= z. 
Universal Horn logic can be interpreted in left exact logic. The right cancellation 
condition can be expressed this way in left exact logic: Introduce a type T 
(xy = ZY [PI(t) = X AP2(t)  =y AP3(t )  = Z) 
so T is the type of triples x, y, z meeting the given condition. Then add an axiom: 
Ol(O=p3(t). In general a universal Horn axiom E(Xl,. ,xn) E (xj , . . . ,xn) is ex- 
pressed in left exact logic by introducing a type to be the extension of E, and assert- 
ing E' of that type. 
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But left exact logic can not always be interpreted in universal horn logic. Working 
in SET, or other categories with excluded middle, given a left exact heory one can 
find a universal Horn theory whose models correspond canonically to those of the 
left exact theory. A SET model of the left exact theory of categories can be 
canonically extended to a model of the universal Horn theory of categories by 
adding a dummy object and declaring its identity arrow to be the composite of all 
'non-composable' pairs. Conversely, the interpretation above shows any model of 
the universal Horn theory gives a model of the left exact heory by forgetting com- 
posites of 'non-composable' pairs. But the tWO doctrines do not give the same mor- 
phisms of models, since all composites must be preserved by a universal Horn 
morphism, not only 'composable' ones. In categories without excluded middle even 
the canonical correspondence of categories fails. 
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